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ΠΕΡIΛΗΨΗ
Το παρόν άρθρο αναφέρεται στους συνταξιούχους του 
ελληνικού δημόσιου ασφαλιστικού φορέα ελευθέρων 
επαγγελματιών (ΟΑΕΕ) και χωρίζεται σε δύο μέρη. Το 
πρώτο μέρος αναφέρεται σε υπολογισμούς σχετικούς με τις 
περικοπές των συντάξεων συγκεκριμένων ασφαλισμένων 
του ΟΑΕΕ. Η ανάλυση των προαναφερθέντων 
υπογραμμίζει τη διαφορά στο χειρισμό των συνταξιούχων 
που λαμβάνουν συντάξεις χαμηλές και υψηλές αντίστοιχα. 
Το δεύτερο κομμάτι ερευνά τη νομική προστασία των 
υψηλόμισθων συνταξιούχων υπό το πρίσμα της ελληνικής 
δημοσιονομικής κρίσης. Το άρθρο καταλήγει ότι ενώ 
δεν υπάρχει νομική προστασία υπό το παρόν νομικό 
πλαίσιο, υπάρχουν ηθικά και νομικά επιχειρήματα υπέρ 
της προστασίας των υψηλόμισθων συνταξιούχων, έτσι 
ώστε να μην υπονομευθεί το νομικό τους καθεστώς λόγω 
έλλειψης οικονομικών πόρων.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: ασφαλιστικό σύστημα, μεταρ-
ρύθμιση ελληνικού συνταξιοδοτικού συστήμα-
τος, περικοπές συντάξεων, αρχή της ανταποδοτι-
κότητας, αρχή της αναλογικής ισότητας
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the pensioners of 
the Greek public pension fund for the self-
employed (OAEE) and is divided into two 
parts. The first part comprises calculations of 
pension reductions in certain cases for the self-
employed. The analysis of the former illustrates 
the great difference in handling pensioners 
receiving low and high old-age pension 
benefits. The second part analyses the legal 
protection of the high-earnings pensioners 
precipitated by the Greek financial crisis. It is 
concluded that while there is no existing legal 
protection, there are some moral and legal 
arguments in support of their protection to 
ensure that their legal status is not undermined 
due to restricted financial resources.
KEY WORDS: pension system, Greek pension 
reform, pension reductions, principle of 
equivalence, principle of proportional equality
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1. Introduction
I n May 2010 , Greece, while trying to contain the lack of resilience in its economy and its banking system, signed financial assistance agreements with the Member States of the Euro-
zone, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter: the Troika). 
In order to meet the conditions of the agreements, Greece has had to adopt a series of austerity 
measures. The Greek Parliament adopted thus a serial of reductions on the old-age pension 
benefits of the current pensioners. The national legislator reduced the old-age pension benefits 
on the basis of the amount of their last gross pension income.
This paper focuses on the reductions of the old-age pensions of the public pension fund for 
the self-employed (OAEE). OAEE was selected as subject of research, since the difference between 
contributions and benefits seems to become more evident in this fund. Aim of this paper is, firstly, 
to present in details the data, which reveal that the self-employed who voluntarily contributed the 
maximum available contributions throughout their entire working lives had their old-age pensions 
reduced from three to eight times more than the old-age pension benefits of those pensioners 
who paid the minimum legislated amount of contributions, in terms of gross income as opposed 
to the paid contributions; and secondly, to address the legal repercussions of this differentiation. 
The paper is structured in two main parts. In the first part, a statistical-actuarial analysis of 
the reductions at issue is provided, making use of legislation and the selected pension amounts 
only. On this ground, a comparison is attempted between the two types of the insured based 
on their contributing patterns; the old-age pensioners who contributed the maximum and those 
who contributed the minimum constantly throughout their working lives. The comparison is 
made on the grounds of both the gross and net pension income. The second part consists of a 
legal approach as regards the reductions at issue taking into account the results presented in the 
first part. In particular, the paper addresses two legal claims that may be available to the current 
pensioners of OAEE: the principle of equivalence and the principle of proportional equality. 
2. Part I
2.1 Introduction and Theoretical Background
 
O AEE is the Greek Social Security Fund for the Self-Employed and is in reality a merger of three funds, the fund for the self-employed (TEBE), the one for professional drivers (TSA) and 
the one for shop owners (TAE). Since the fund started in 2007, in order to look into pensioners 
it is obligatory to go back and calculate the part of the pension according to the old legislation.
 The calculations in this text have been made accordingly and refer to people who have 
contributed to only one fund, the one for the self-employed before the merger (TEBE) and the 
merged fund thereafter (OAEE).It is noted that TEBE accounts for almost 75% of OAEE currently, 
as regards new pensioners. Also, the whole working life of people retiring now is calculated on 
TEBE legislation for the people contributing in this scheme before 2007, while contributions 
were made according to OAEE classes. An insurance class actually defines to what extent a person 
contributes to a scheme. The categorization is made on the grounds of the monthly wages – as 
in the case of the Greek Private Employees Fund or on the grounds of the years of service, or a 
combination of the two. As regards TEBE, up until 1991 the insured would be classified based 
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on their annual income but since, all classes are theoretical. This means that the amounts of 
contributions are calculated on theoretical/presumptive earnings. Some of these are mandatory 
while others are optional. The same thing stands for contributions in all four funds (the merged 
and the three sub-funds). They are based on presumptive earnings, according to legislation. 
 The calculations in this text have all been made according to TEBE legislation, since this is 
where most inequalities are spotted. All pension amounts correspond to real pensioners currently 
receiving their pensions from OAEE. Sensitive data like Social Security numbers or Identification 
numbers have not been used but the amounts are all real. Further on, all pensioners are at least 
60 years of age, thus the extra reductions of ar.44 par.11 L.3986/2011(a list of the laws of the 
reductions and their effect can be found in the appendix) do not apply. Also, being more than 
60 years of age in 2012, the pensioners receive the 800 euro worth annual seasonal payments, 
where applicable ( refers to net income calculations).
Under TEBE there were ten insurance classes (A-J) and, subsequently, fourteen categories 
in OAEE. The insured would enter the system (TEBE) and contribute for a few years in the first 
compulsory class (5th class based on the last legislation), then move accordingly, until they reach 
the maximum compulsory class which, under TEBE, was the 8th (H), leaving the 9th and 10th( I,J) 
as the optional. As far as the optional classes are concerned, only people who decided to do so 
could contribute a maximum amount per month hence building towards an increased amount of 
pension. These contributors had to apply for their inclusion in the optional classes. This means 
that people with a strong feeling of saving for their third age decided to voluntarily contribute 
more in order to enjoy a better level of living after retirement.
The evolution of the insurance classes was affected by legislation which had been applied 
through the years. The broad context though, is the one mentioned above and details on 
legislation are not mentioned since they do not fit the scope of this paper, where real examples 
incorporating these changes have been used.
In the appendix, one can see the table with the presumptive insurance classes for 2009 
through 2012, as they were kept stable for four years. As mentioned before, they are based on 
presumptive earnings.The connection between the class and the respective amount of income is 
the following: The amount of contribution is 20% the amount of the respective income. These 
classes are used to calculate the amount of pension for each year and month in each class the 
person has contributed. The basic pension amount, a flat rate bonus amount (ar.9 MD 116/1988), 
is added to the sum calculated from the years and months of service. Any pension calculated to 
be below the minimum automatically becomes the minimum.
The examples provided are based on 30, 35 and 40 years of service. The reasons as many 
years of service were chosen are the following:
To begin with, minimum pensions (usually with few years of contribution, just above 15) 
needed to be generally avoided as a strong impact of the notion of Social Security is included, as 
is expected. Then, since 35 years of service used to be the norm as well as the legislated threshold 
until 2009 for most Greek Public Pension Schemes, it is interesting to examine what happens 
both slightly over and under it.
Moreover, in order to clearly illustrate the point of the paper, the two extreme possible 
cases are dealt with: People contributing to the minimum possible insurance class, and those 
contributing to the maximum possible insurance class, all across their working lives.Having 
implemented all the possible legislation, as is reasonable since real examples are used, the 
transition was chosen with one main criterion. So that people who always followed the mandatory 
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path as opposed to those who always opted for the maximum available class are contrasted and 
the results are analyzed.
These completely opposite paradigms immediately outline the intense difference in pension 
reductions for the two kinds of pensioners with the different contributing patterns.
Table 1. Results for gross income
Years of service Contributing pattern
Monthly pension amount before 
the reductions
Monthly pension amount after 
reductions
30
Min 1255 1181
Max 2468 1752
35
Min 1492 1317
Max 2847 1845
40
Min 1673 1425
Max 3355 2058
To begin with, one can see six examples of pensioners whose working life is 30,35 and 40 
years and for each respective amount of years of service one of the pensioners contributed at the 
minimum possible level, while the other at the maximum. The amounts of monthly pension for 
the years 2009 and 2012, hence before and after the reductions, can be seen in the two columns 
to the right in the table above. The calculation of the pension amounts before the reductions is a 
matter of routine when resorting to Table 2 in the appendix, while in the second case it becomes 
a lot more complex. For the second case, the ultimate goal is the calculation of the monthly 
pension amount for January 2013, as it will have been formed after all the reductions.
Since the basic amount which is added to the earnings related pension amount is in a 
form of a bonus and has been legislated on the grounds of Welfare, it is to be deducted from 
the pension amounts. In the first case, all 220 euros are deducted while in the second case the 
deduction follows the rules of the whole pension amount deduction, as is legislated. Hence, the 
table is now formed as:
Table 2. Monthly pension amounts before and after the reductions without 
the basic pension amount
Years of 
service
Contributing 
pattern
Monthly pension amount before 
the reductions excluding 
the basic pension amount
Monthly pension amount after 
reductions excluding the basic 
pension amount
30
Min 1035 1000
Max 2248 1655
35
Min 1272 1195
Max 2627 1800
40
Min 1453 1291
Max 3135 1963
The great difference in reductions is already evident. However, the calculation of the 
replacement rates which follows below, gives more light to the above difference.
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The replacement rate of any pension is given by the division of the first monthly pension 
amount of a pensioner to his last monthly wage as a contributor. It is one of the main drivers 
when looking into the reduction or not of the standard of living of a person after retirement. It 
is worth noting here that the people insured in OAEE are not one of the groups that are mainly 
affected by the reduction of their standard of living after retirement.Besides, this is not the 
central idea behind this text.
In this text, the working life-long average of contributions indexed by the fund has been 
used as the last monthly wage. There are two reasons for making this assumption, actuarial 
in nature. First, since all contributions are used to calculate the final pension amount of the 
insured in OAEE and not just the last 5 or 10 years as in other funds like the fund for the private 
employees in Greece until recently, using the whole career contributions average is also a good 
choice that follows the same notion. Then, since wages here are theoretical, a life-long average 
responds better to the calculations of the text and the idea behind them.
Table 3. Calculation of replacement rates before and after the reductions, for 
pension amounts including or excluding the basic pension amount
Years of 
service
Contributing 
pattern
Replacement 
Rate before 
reductions
Replacement 
Rate after 
reductions
Replacement Rate be-
fore reductions exclud-
ing the basic pension 
amount
Replacement Rate 
after reductions 
excluding the basic 
pension amount
30
Min 109% 103% 90% 87%
Max 99% 70% 90% 66%
35
Min 138% 122% 118% 111%
Max 126% 82% 116% 80%
40
Min 176% 150% 153% 136%
Max 162% 99% 151% 95%
The replacement rates are a good way to put the message across coherently, as regards the 
differences in handling the two types of pensioners. An even more straightforward way to prove 
the abovementioned though, is the calculation of the reduction percentages of the replacement 
rates. These percentages provide a numerical explanation of the reduction of the standard of 
living of the two types of pensioners.
Table 4. Reduction percentages of the replacement rates
Years of 
service
Contributing 
pattern
Reduction percentage of the 
replacement rate
Reduction percentage of the replacement rates 
excluding the basic pension amount
30
Min -6% -3%
Max -29% -26%
35
Min -12% -6%
Max -35% -31%
40
Min -15% -11%
Max -39% -37%
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It becomes obvious that the insured who contributed the least possible amount throughout 
their working lives receive much fewer reductions than the people who contributed the maximum, 
up to almost eight times less reduction for 30 years of service. 
Finally, it is worth looking at a comparative table for contributions and benefits for the two 
types of pensioners, in contrast to the reduction percentages of replacement rates.
Table 5. Relative connection between contributions and benefits 
in contrast to the reduction percentages of the replacement rates 
excluding the basic pension amount
Years of 
service
Contributing 
pattern
Accrued 
contributions
Contribution rate 
min/max
Connection between reduction 
rate of replacement rates
30
Min 82782   7,85 
Max 179760 217%  
35
Min 90530   5,22 
Max 189480 209%  
40
Min 91118   3,37 
Max 199200 219%  
The above table can be interpreted as follows:
For 30 years of service, the insured who paid the maximum contributions, has paid, based 
on the current values of the theoretical insurance classes, 217 percent more contributions and 
has received a 7,85 times greater reduction in his standard of living, excluding the basic pension 
amount. 
Respectively, for 35 years of service, the insured who paid the maximum contributions, 
has paid, based on the current values of the theoretical insurance classes, 209 percent more 
contributions and has received 5,22 percent greater reduction in his standard of living, excluding 
the basic pension amount.
Finally,for 40 years of service, the insured who paid the maximum contributions, has paid, 
based on the current values of the theoretical insurance classes, 219 percent more contributions 
than the insured who paid the minimum, and has received 3,37 percent greater reduction in his 
standard of living, excluding the basic pension amount.
2.2 Results for net income
T o illustrate the disparity in handling the two types of insured of the fund with these different contributing patterns, it is deemed necessary to look into the final, net income of pensioners 
after the reductions. In the Greek Pension System, it is not often that actuarial valuations 
provide net income. For example, when the Hellenic Republic provides actuarial valuations for 
the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), it always provides gross 
income. This is because of a lot of reasons, one of the most important being that the Greek tax 
system changes at least every few years in the last decade, and the policy makers most of the 
times provide the tax brackets for the current year when the first or even the second payment 
have already been made. 
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Constantly applying new taxes, either via deduction at source or when clearing, the policy 
makers do not help tax payers to organize properly, especially when some of these taxes are 
applied retroactively, as is the case for many of the reductions.
In this text, however, looking into the net income is more than necessary since it helps the 
main point of the text be proved beyond any doubt. Moreover, it helps move from a statistical 
analysis including an actuarial assumption to the study of net pension amounts thus anyone 
who had been sceptic about the assumption can now be driven to equivalent conclusion not 
including the latter. Also, people who are not familiar with the actuarial science can perceive 
the point in an easier way.
For the exact calculations, fourteen payments per year have been taken into consideration 
as the law instructed for 2009, for all OAEE pensioners. In contrast, for 2012 the two seasonal 
payments have been replaced by three payments of 200,200 and 400 euros for Easter, annual 
leave and Christmas payments respectively. These amounts were given only to pensioners whose 
monthly pension amounts were below 2.500 euros gross, in 2012. Finally, the reductions of 
L.4093/2012 have not been taken into consideration as they would have to be matched with 
the 2013 tax scheme. The latter has not yet been announced as in the first days of 2013 thus 
confirming the comment above about people not being able to organize their financial matters 
due to the policy makers.
The tax schemes for the years 2009 and 2012 have been provided in the appendix to avoid 
confusion and unnecessary length of the main body of the paper.
Using the tables in the appendix one can come up with the net pension income below, 
provided no other tax-deductible disbursal has been used besides the 4% health coverage which 
is the same for all OAEE pensioners and is applied on the monthly pension amounts, but not the 
seasonal ones. Besides, any other tax-deductible disbursal is not universal; hence it is beyond the 
notion of this text.
Table 6. Net annual pension amounts for the year 2009
Annual Pension 
Amount 2009
Health Branch 
Contribution Taxable income 2009 Tax Final net income
17.567 602 16.965 1.241 15.723
34.550 1.185 33.365 5.678 27.687
20.883 716 20.167 2.042 18.125
39.859 1.367 38.492 7.472 31.020
23.416 803 22.613 2.653 19.960
46.973 1.611 45.363 9.877 35.486
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Table 7. Net annual pension amounts for the year 2012
Annual Pension 
Amount 2012
Health Branch 
Contribution Taxable income 2012 Tax Final net income
15.714 597 15.117 1.261 13.705
24.166 935 23.232 3.228 19.539
17.418 665 16.753 1.556 15.030
26.841 1.042 25.799 3.870 21.414
18.900 724 18.176 1.964 16.030
29.855 1.162 28.692 4.593 23.525
Comparing and contrasting the two tables above, one can make the comparing table below, 
which leaves – once again – no room for misunderstanding.
Table 8. Results for net income
Years of service Contributing pattern
Income rate 
2009/2012
Income rate of 
change
Connection between 
replacement rate reductions
30
Min 87% -13%  2,29 
Max 71% -29%  
35
Min 83% -17%  1,81 
Max 69% -31%  
40
Min 80% -20%  1,71 
Max 66% -34%  
The rate of change of net income of the insured that paid the maximum amount of 
contributions is reduced by approximately twice as much in all cases. This constitutes proof of 
the difference in the handling of the two types of pensioners. Havingtheirnetincomereducedby
about 30% inanycase, peoplewhowere forethoughtful were deprived of one third of their net 
income in just four years.The ones that contributed to the minimum had their income reduced 
to only thirteen to twenty percent. These latter reductions were definitely not minor ones, but 
evidently much milder than the ones above.
2.3 Concluding Remarks
T he results provided above prove beyond the shadow of a doubt the disparity of handling between the insured in OAEE with the different contributing patterns, as analyzed above. 
It is also worth noting that the more a low-earner contributed, the greatest the reduction 
they received were when comparing to the person with the opposite pattern but the same 
years of service. The latter stand for both reductions in replacement rate as well as reductions 
in net income.
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It should be noted here that this comparison is made among the insured within the fund 
and not generally. OAEE – with replacement rates as calculated in table 3 – ranging from 70 
percent to more than 100 percent including the basic amount is a fund that sufficiently pays back 
the insured their contributions.
Based on this last conclusion, one can account for the great reduction in pensions in OAEE 
as a whole, but the difference in handling is still not justified.
What is happening in reality is that the policy-makers are penalizing the people with 
hindsight. Those who – instead of spending their money on plenty other needs – decided to save 
it in their social security scheme. And it goes without saying, that these people who contributed 
more were also the ones who supported the Greek Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system and sustained 
a steady level of cash-flow from the insured to the pensioners. One could say that in the wide-
spread ancient Aesop fable, the Cicada and the Ant, the Cicada has finally found its vindication.
3. Part II
3.1 Introduction
S everal social security systems from their very beginning were structured on the combination of two basic mechanisms, the solidarity agreements and an “insurance relation” implying the 
payment of contributions by the employed and the employers. This Bismarckian type of social 
insurance in particular is based on the principle of equivalence, albeit it also comprises elements 
of solidarity (Clasen and Oorschot, 2002: 98), In this respect, social security represents a broader 
social aim (solidarity in a society) trying to assure the funding of the system through a structure 
of correspondence between contributions and benefits (social insurance). The social security 
systems in this form have already been known as functioning under the social solidarity and the 
equivalence principle. For the purposes of this research, solidarity is defined as the redistribution 
from good to bad risks and from richer to poorer contributors or non-conributors (Clasen and 
Oorschot, 2002: 98), while equivalence is conceived as the principle indicating that the social 
benefits should be provided in proportionality with the paid contributions (Stergiou, 2012: 323). 
Both of these terms have been analyzed by the jurisprudence and utilized by the relative courts 
when assessing social security rights. It has to be noted that the in-built tension between the 
principle of solidarity and need is likely to become more precarious when the latter elements 
expand, potentially undermining the schemes’ legitimacy in the eye of those who financially 
contribute most; however, these potential pressures on social insurance do not necessarily imply 
the importance of the solidarity principle is bound to decline (Erskine and Clasen, 1997).
 Generally, it is observed that the equivalence principle seems to fall back more and more 
mainly by reasons related to the endangered social capital when fiscal aims are in the spotlight. 
This is the case at present taking into account the national public deficit and the measures the 
Greek state is obliged to apply in order to deal with its debt and its creditors. Principally, the 
national legislator has the discretional power to introduce the necessary legal acts in order to 
respond to the emerging socio-economic needs. However, the legal doctrine and the relative case-
law have developed certain rules and principles according to which the legislator’s interference 
with pension rights is to take place, namely the protection of the equivalence principle (II) as well 
as the protection of proportional equality (III).
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3.2 The Principle of Equivalence
The social insurance system in Greece operates under public law and is enshrined within 
Article 22 paragraph 5 of the Greek Constitution, according to which “The State shall care for the 
social insurance of the working people, as specified by law”. The Greek jurisprudence1 as well as 
a large part of the Greek literature (Kremalis, 1998: 442; Kontiadis, 2004: 380) interpreting the 
Article 22 par 5 acknowledged the constitutional guarantee of social insurance as an institution, 
whose core elements may not be affected. The Greek jurisprudence has not yet specified the 
core elements of the social insurance institution. The Greek literature has supported that two 
of the main substances of the social insurance system are: the principle of social solidarity and 
the principle of equivalence (Angelopoulou, 2009: 157). Taking into account, thus, the main 
substances of the social insurance system, we could advocate that the legislator is expected 
to protect the social insurance institution and the overall system by giving these substances in 
practice the constitutional value with which the Greek Constitution has enclosed them.
The principle of solidarity and the principle of equivalence seem to lie uneasily with each 
other. On the one hand, the principle of solidarity aims to decline the gap among the benefi-
ciaries of the old-age pension benefits’ level in view of repairing the social inequalities and 
upgrading somehow the less-advantaged of the society.2 On the other hand, the principle of 
equivalence aims to assure a proportional relationship between the paid contributions and the 
provided benefits securing to the beneficiary the same living standards before and after retire-
ment (Stergiou, 2013: 23).
The Greek Constitution does not explicitly provide which of these two principles has priority 
in Greek social security law. The latter is dependent on the social policy decided by the successive 
Greek governments. The Greek public pension system is financed on a pay-as –you-go basis: the 
money earned by the employed generation is paid to current pensioners (Ministry of Employ-
ment and Social Protection, 2005: 5) following the Bismarck approach (Korda, 2013: 149).3 Its 
function was enacted in the 1950’s to cover the risk of ageing through cash benefits and services 
(Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2002: 5). However, it also foresees elements of solidarity.
After the Second World War, key contributor to the Greek pension system became the principle 
of social solidarity, which can be witnessed through the social security bills No. 1846/1951 and 
No. 2698/1953 concerning the establishment of minimum pension income and No. 4169/1961, 
according to which farmers were covered through a compulsory scheme funded only through 
general taxation and not through contributions (Katrougalos, 2009: 232). After the restoration 
of democracy in 1975 till today, the principle of solidarity elements commanded further an im-
portant position in the Greek public pension system providing generous funding process and uni-
versal coverage. The State guarantees a fixed amount, not equivalent to contributions paid and 
the pension levels are not dependent on the range of insured persons or on the amount of con-
tributions (Börsch-Supan/Tinios, 2002: 398). The principle of equivalence became thus secondary. 
 Τhe Greek jurisprudence has often resortedto the principle of social solidarity a contrario 
to the principle of equivalence, in order to justify the non-equivalence between the high level 
of contributions with the lower amount of the old-age pension benefits (Stergiou, 2005: 171). 
More particular, according to the Council of State, the legislation foreseeing that there should 
be a limit on the amount of the old-age pension benefits is constitutional, since the principle of 
equivalence does not enjoy constitutional consolidation and for the protection of the principle 
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of social solidarity.4 Similarly, the Council of State has adjudicated that “the legislator is allowed, 
in virtue of the social solidarity principle, to enact more favorable treatment for the economi-
cally weak of the social insured”,5 while the Court of Justice of the European Union which has 
stated that “social security systems are directed towards a social goal and shall also comply 
with the principle of solidarity”6 Exceptionally, a precedent in favour of the high-earnings ben-
eficiaries was created by the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court No. 4837/1997.6 In 
this case, the Court examined the granting of hospital and medical expenses to the commercial 
naval officers; the social insurance fund of the navy covered the 80% of the hospital and medical 
expenses of all the high-earnings beneficiaries. This percentage is lower compared to the cover 
of the hospital and medical expenses of the lower classes of naval crew that had proportionally 
contributed less. The Court declared that it constitutes an infringement of the constitutional 
principle of equivalence the fact that higher amount of social benefits for the same social risk is 
granted to the beneficiaries that have paid less contributions to the fund in comparison to those 
beneficiaries of the same fund that have paid higher contributions. 
 Therefore, taking into consideration the above, on the one hand, to a certain extent, a 
differentiation leading to a greater burden on the shoulders of the insured that paid higher con-
tributions to the pension system is in compliance with the duty of social solidarity, deriving from 
Art. 25 par. 5 of the Greek Constitution considering also the general interest of the social aims’ 
materialization and the fact that the national fiscal balances is under threat.7 On the other hand, 
however, the principle of equivalence should not be refuted at all under a defective conveyance 
of the solidarity principle in practice, since both constitute main cores of the social insurance as 
an institution (Stergiou, 2008: 844). A fair balance should be guaranteed between the two prin-
ciples. This fair balance should be established through limits. These limits are to be set through 
the principle of proportional equality (Stergiou 2013: 31).
3.3 The Principle of (Proportional) Equality
I t is not always the case that the principle of social solidarity is lawfully implemented when pushing aside other constitutional principles and rights which enjoy equivalent legal value. 
Most importantly, the principle of equality is of primary importance in the field of shaping social 
security rights. Both the legislative and the administrative power are to introduce measures that 
will not infringe the principle at issue, as the latter is intrinsically connected with social insurance 
and its social goals. Some measures in favor of the less-advantaged (low-earnings pensioners) may 
be allowed for the fulfillment of the social goals of the social insurance institution combined with 
the application of the social solidarity principle (Stergiou, 2012). There have been established 
though certain criteria according to which the possible measures of favorable treatment will be 
decided. As it has been advocated, the measures have to be objective and justified, while the 
law-maker is not allowed to proceed arbitrarily to obviously unequal treatment.8
 The principle of equality under Article 4 par. 1 Gr. Const. is conceived in the field of social 
insurance as the concept of the proportional equality (typical or legal analogy): every measure 
which leads to an equation of unlike categories or conditions contravenes the principle of the 
proportional equality (Stergiou, 2012: 322). As to the social insurance, the principle at issue 
imposes the participation of all the insured in the system of contributions and benefits under 
equal terms (Stergiou 2012: 322). In parallel, the same principle implies a contrario that a non-
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equal treatment of the insured is to be applied at the level of benefits on the basis of a different 
degree of participation (through contributions) in the social insurance system; namely, equality 
entails the acceptance of differentiation by categorizing the insured according to objective and 
justified criteria which are seen as limits on arbitrary legislature (Stergiou, 2012). 
3.4 Reduction of the “High” Old-Age Pension Benefits after 
the Greek Crisis
A fter the crisis since today, the old-age pension benefits of the self-employed that contributed the maximum possible amount throughout their working lives have been reduced almost 
three to eight times more in relation to those who contributed the least possible amount. It 
has to be noted though that the crisis is not only about economy, but it is also about the social 
changes and differentiation and the insurance technique in particular (Sakellaropoulos 2010: 
381).Financial consolidation cannot be materialised exclusively through changes of the internal 
parameters of social insurance such as the increase of the retirement age or the contributions 
and the reduction of benefits (Sakellaropoulos, 2010: 385). As was proved in the first part of the 
present paper, The old-age pension benefits of the pensioners that contributed the maximum 
possible amount through their working lives (first group) were reduced from 26 per cent to 37 
per cent, while the old-age pension benefits of the pensioners that contributed the least possible 
(second group) was reduced 3 per cent to 11 per cent. An additional consideration should be 
given to the continuous reductions of the first group taking into account that they paid about 
200% more contribution to the fund in comparison to the second group. This disregards the 
principle of equivalence enshrined within the Article 22 par. 5 of the Gr. Const. Aim of these 
reductions was to meet the new economic challenges, namely the high fiscal public debt, as 
well as to protect the “low-earnings” pensioners. A question, which is ripe for consideration, is, 
however, whether the principle of equivalence and of the proportional equality should be refuted 
at all in the name of the social solidarity as a plea. 
The initial function of the old-age pension benefits should be to keep the similar standards 
of living before and after retirement (Stergiou 2010: 86; Stergiou 2012: 338; Stergiou 2013: 29). 
Shall the legislator neglect the fact that a segment of the self-employed paid voluntarily higher 
contributions to their public pension fund than other self-employed who paid the minimum 
compulsory contribution, this means that the old-age pension benefits acquires the character of 
social assistance, in which prior contributions are not playing a role as far as the level of the social 
benefits are concerned. This, however, removes the character of social insurance that is explicitly 
guaranteed in Article 22 par. 5 of the Gr. Const.
 Moreover, except for completely annulling the equivalence principle in this way, the legal 
acts at issue contravene the principle of proportional equality, while introducing an erroneously 
conceived solidarity. The Greek public pension system is not purely based on solidarity elements 
but it is also based on obligatory contributions and this creates a right to old-age pension benefits 
corresponding proportionally to the amount of the contributions made to the pension fund of 
the self-employed as well as to the period of time during which the contributions were made. 
As it has been adjudicated, though, by the European Court of Human Rights in a relevant case12, 
the imposed by the public interest measures to deal with the social security’s fund’s financial 
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problems cannot burden only a certain number of pensioners who had to bear the most intensive 
measure of all, whereas the vast majority of the other pensioners continued to receive benefits at 
the same level as before the legislation came into force (Kapuy, 2007: 229; Heredero, 2007: 30). It 
is not about social solidarity and repairing social inequalities when measures as the current ones 
introduce obviously unfavorable reductions imposing excessive burdens only to a certain category 
of population. Specifically, the pensioners are not classified by criteria suitable for the application 
of reductions such as the duration of insurance or the height of the contributions (equivalence), 
but they are treated in a unified way without the necessary differentiation (Stergiou 2013: 26).
Last but not least, introducing reductions in a progressive scale at the expense of thοse that 
contributed the maximum available amount of contributions cannot be used at the expense of 
the principles of equivalence and proportional equality, when the measures are lacking of proper 
actuarial studies to prove that are appropriate for the aims they are supposed to fulfill, the resolu-
tion of the social insurance system’s financial needs at a macroeconomic level (Temming-Davilla, 
2011: 414). Namely, there was not an elaborate research in order to stimulate accurately the way 
in which the concrete reductions under discussion would serve the limitation of expenditures and 
the guaranteeing of the system’s financial sustainability being considered as State’s obligations. 
In fact, the obligation for previously conducted actuarial studies is imposed by the article 22, par. 
5 Greek Const., as well as by the article 70, par. 3 of the European Code of Social Security and 
article 71, par. 3 of ILO Convention 102/1952 (Stergiou 2010: 89). Undoubtedly, reductive mea-
sures of that intense can been regarded as resulting in the infringement of the pensions’ equiva-
lence constituting at the same time a breach of the equality principle as far as the participation 
in the public burdens is concerned (Stergiou 2013: 34). 
4. Conclusion - Remarks
T his paper has addressed the very topical question of the high reductions of the self-employed of the OAEE in accordance to the paid amount of contributions. In the first session of the 
paper, we found that the people who were willing to set aside more funds for their third age 
have come into a far greater reduction in both their gross and net incomes than the ones who 
chose to save only the mandatory amounts. These results have had a significant impact on the 
constitutional rights of the current pensioners. In the second session, the paper highlights two 
potential constitutional principles, which may be available to the current pensioners: the principle 
of equivalence and the principle of the proportional equality. It analyses the interpretation of both 
principles in the Greek jurisdiction in reference to the principle of social solidarity. It concludes that 
while pension reductions are not per se prohibited by law, new circumstances call for new thoughts 
and so a re-evaluation of the content under the proportional relationship of the institution should 
make its appearance in Court and legal theory. Certain concessions, as outlined in the paper, have 
to be made to protect the rights of the pensioners directly affected by law. 
Namely, while the principle of social solidarity is accepted as justifying the large 
differentiation between the reductions adopted on the pensioners that contributed the minimum 
and the maximum amount to the self-employed fund, the national legislator should take into 
consideration the principle of equivalence and proportional equality alongside with the principle 
of social solidarity under certain conditions. Firstly, the principle of equality comes to set the 
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conditions on the legislator’s options; and secondly, a fair balance should be kept between the 
principles of equivalence and social solidarity, on the basis of which the social security system’s 
function has been structured, in the way that the burden of the problem is distributed. One issue 
that is unresolved, however, is the imposition of actuarial studies. In the case under research, 
a certain category of old-age pension benefits was reduced to a greater extent than the other 
category under comparison. 
The legislature is to ensure the protection of the equivalence and solidarity principles-core 
elements of the social insurance by assuring their application correspondingly. Notwithstanding 
the case-law has not recognized a direct application of the equivalence principle, it cannot be 
disregarded that especially in relation to social insurance funds mainly based on contributions there 
has been a connection with a sufficient element of equivalence. We could claim that the reluctance 
till now from the competent Courts’ adjudications to utilize the existence of the equivalence 
principle should be seen with more skepticism under the current socio-economic context. 
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Appendix
Table 1. Laws including reductions applicable on OAEE pensioners and their 
effect
L. 3845/2010 ar.3 par.10,14 as 
modified with L.4038/2012 ar.24 
as modified with L.4093/2012 
ar.1 subpar. ΙΑ6/3 as modified 
with Legislative Resolution Ga-
zette 229/19-11-12 ar.10 par.3
Pensioners above 60 years of age 
with an income of monthly pen-
sions below 2.500 euros gross, 
receive seasonal payments of 
total worth:
Effective 
2010:
800 euros
Effective 2013:
0 euros
L. 3863/2010, ar. 38
effective 1/08/2010,
as modified with 
L. 3986/2011, ar. 44 par. 10
effective1/08/2011
Monthly Solidarity Contribution 
for Pensioners (Gross pension 
amounts)
Effective 
1/08/2010
Effective 
1/08/2011
1.400,01 to 1.700, 00 3% 3%
1.700,01 to 2.000,00 4% 6%
2.000, 01 to 2.300,00 5% 7%
2.300,01 to 2.600,00 6% 9%
2.600,01 to 2.900,00 7% 10%
2.900,01 to 3.200,00 8% 12%
3.200,01 to 3.500,00 9% 13%
3.500,01 or more 10% 14%
L. 3986/2011, ar. 44 par.11
Effective 1/08/2011
Additional Contribution on gross pensions for pensioners below 
60 years of age:
1.700,01 to 2.300,00 - 6%
2.300,01 to 2.900,00 - 8%
More than2.900,01 - 10%
L. 3863/2010, ar. 69
Effective 1/08/2010
Additional Contribution of 1 euro per month for all pensioners
L. 4024/2011, ar. 2
Effective 1/11/2011
Reduction of 20% on the part of the pension that exceeds 1.200 
euro gross, as has been formed after the implementation of the 
abovementioned laws.
L. 4051/2012, ar. 6
Effective 1/01/2012
Reduction of 12% on the part of the pension that exceeds 1.300 
euro gross, as has been formed after the implementation of the 
abovementioned laws.
L.4093/2012, subpar. .ΙΑ5.
Effective 1/01/2013.
A further reduction on pensions as have been formed after the 
implementation of the abovementioned laws.
1.000,01 to 1.500,00 5% (but not less than 1.000,01 )
1.500,01 to 2.000,00 10% (but not less than 1.425,01)
2.000,01 to 3.000,00 15% (but not less than 1.800,01)
3.000,01 or more 20% (but not less than 2.550,01)
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Table 2. TEBE Insurance Classes Contributions and Pension Calculation for 
the years 2009 through 2012 based on Presumptive Earnings
  InsuranceClass  
Monthly presumptive 
insurance class 
contribution
Year ( X% of the 
class amount)
Month ( X% of the class 
amount divided by 12)
0-30 Years 
15%
A 1 55 8,25 0,69
B 2 77 11,55 0,96
C 3 100 15,00 1,25
D 4 123 18,45 1,54
E 5 162 24,30 2,03
F 6 186 27,90 2,33
G 7 228 34,20 2,85
H 8 280 42,00 3,50
I 9 423 63,45 5,29
J 10 515 77,25 6,44
31-35 Years 
25%
A 1 55 13,75 1,15
B 2 77 19,25 1,60
C 3 100 25,00 2,08
D 4 123 30,75 2,56
E 5 162 40,50 3,38
F 6 186 46,50 3,88
G 7 228 57,00 4,75
H 8 280 70,00 5,83
I 9 423 105,75 8,81
J 10 515 128,75 10,73
36 Years and 
over 30%
A 1 55 16,50 1,38
B 2 77 23,10 1,93
C 3 100 30,00 2,50
D 4 123 36,90 3,08
E 5 162 48,60 4,05
F 6 186 55,80 4,65
G 7 228 68,40 5,70
H 8 280 84,00 7,00
I 9 423 126,90 10,58
J 10 515 154,50 12,88
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In 2009, before the pension reductions, the tax brackets used to be:
Table 3. Tax Brackets for Pensioners for the Year 2009 / Fiscal Year 2010
Tax Brackets for Pensioners for the Year 2009 / Fiscal Year 2010
Tax Bracket Tax rate Bracket tax
Sum
Income Tax
12.000 0% 0 12.000 0
18.000 25% 4.500 30.000 4.500
45.000 35% 15.750 75.000 20.250
Surtax 40%      
Since then, the tax brackets have changed and the ones for the year 2012 are shown in the 
table below:
Table 4. Tax Brackets for Pensioners for the Year 2012 / Fiscal Year 2013
Tax Brackets for Pensioners for the Year 2012 / Fiscal Year 2013
Tax Bracket Tax rate Bracket tax
Sum
Income Tax
5.000 0% 0 5.000 0
7.000 10% 700 12.000 700
4.000 18% 720 16.000 1.420
10.000 25% 2.500 26.000 3.920
14.000 35% 4900 40.000 8820
20.000 38% 7.600 60.000 16.420
40.000 40% 16.000 100.000 32.420
Surtax 45%      
issue17.indd   45 16/6/2014   4:02:25 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:51:10 |
[46] ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗ ΣΥΝΟΧΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗ 
Besides the above tax calculation table, another kind of tax applicable to pensioners for the 
year 2012 is shown below:
Table 4. Tax brackets for the special contribution for pensioners for year 
2012 / Fiscal Year 2013 (L.3986/2011 ,ar.29)
Special contribution for Pensioners Brackets for the year 2012 / 
Fiscal Year 2013
0-12.000 0%
12.001-20.000 1%
20.001-50.000 2%
50.001-100.000 3%
Surtax 4%
Sources for Part I
OAEE pensioners files for the years 2008-2012
Hellenic Ministry of Labor and Social Security
Hellenic Ministry of Finance
Hellenic Statistical Authority
Labor Legislation Bulletin
Notes
1. Council of State, No. 2253/1976; Areios Pagos, No. 52/1982.
2. Council of State No.4837/2007.
3. The PAYG system establishes a bilateral relationship between the currently employed 
and the pensioners to whom the earmarked revenues are redistributed as cash ben-
efits. See more Hinrichs, in: Petersen/Petersen (eds.), The politics of age, p. 119.
4. Council of State No.707/2006; No. 527/2009.
5. Council of State No.4837/2007.
6. StE 4837/1997, Databank Nomos.
7. Council of State No. 4078/96.
8. El. Syn. 1743/91; Dioik. Prot. Ath. 33307; THPDD 7/2008.
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